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Abstract. In his paper [9], Stadler develops techniques for improving the
security of existing secret sharing protocols by allowing to check whether the
secret shares given out by the dealer are valid. In particular, the secret sharing
is executed over abelian groups. In this paper we develop similar methods over
non-abelian groups.
1. Introduction to Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is the process which involves a dealer and n participants. The
dealer picks a secret and hands out to each participant an element, not equal to
the secret, called a share through a secure channel. When any k of the participants
come together, they can compute the secret, where k is called the threshold. Secret
sharing has the property that if any k− 1 participants come together, it is difficult
for them to deduce the secret. The main example of this process is called Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [10]. Stadler uses it in his first example of PVSS. The main
application is the situation in which there is a bank with n managers and at least
k managers have to be together to open a vault.
The method of secret sharing depends on the benevolence of the dealer because
any party involved must trust that the dealer is distributing valid shares to each
participant. Verifiable secret sharing adds a layer of security to the scheme by
solving the problem of a cheating dealer. In other words, a verifiable secret sharing
(VSS) sheme prevents the dealer from distributing a share to a participant that,
together with an appropriate number of other shares, does not yield the secret.
The goal of publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) is to allow anyone to verify
that the participants received valid shares. In particular, Pi can check that Pj has a
valid share. Applications of PVSS are software key escrow and design of electronic
cash systems. An example of key escrow is Micali’s fair cryptosystems [11].
In practice, the protocols proposed use a similar method for accomplishing their
respective goals. In a VSS scheme, the dealer would make one or more pieces of
information public as proof. Participants would then compute a value using their
secret share and compare it to the public proof. In the PVSS scheme, both the
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dealer and participants publish encrypted values of their secret information. It is
preferable that the proof and/or encrypted values involve the least amount of pieces
of information possible to prevent the dealer from providing proof that a fake share
is valid to a particular participant (defeating the purpose of the scheme).
A VSS scheme can be non-interactive, meaning that the participants are not
required to interact with each other in order to verify the validity of their shares.
Moreover, in a PVSS scheme, the dealer distributes the shares to each participant
using an assymetric key encryption algorithm. Using the public information and
possible additional interaction with the dealer, any person can check that the en-
crypted secret share is valid. In the case that no interaction with the dealer is
required, the PVSS scheme is called non-interactive.
This paper describes the two protocols developed by Stadler, both of which rely
heavily on the well-known El Gamal encryption sheme. Next, we illustrate a new
VSS sheme that uses nonabelian groups. Lastly, we attempt to mimick Stadler’s
schemes using the non abelian version of El Gamal’s scheme, however we were
unable to efficiently use all pieces of information, making the scheme insecure.
1.1. Discrete Logarithm and Zp scheme. The following describes a Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme with an additional non-interactive VSS and PVSS protocol.
In the PVSS protocol, the dealer uses El Gamal’s scheme to distribute the shares
and then proves to a verifier that the pair (A,B) associated to the participant Pi
encrypts the discrete logarithm of a public element V . (see [9])
• Fixed: p a large prime, q = (p−1)2 prime, h ∈ Z
∗
p order q, G a group of
order p, g a generator of G, s ∈ Z is the secret, k threshold.
• Public info: S = gs, nonzero xi ∈ Zp assigned to Pi. , Fj = g
fj for
random fj ∈ Zp and j < k.
• Private to Pi: si = s+
k−1∑
j=1
fix
j
i (mod p).
• Secret can be recovered using Lagrange interpolation.
• VSS algorithm: Pi computes Si = S
k−1∏
j=1
F
x
j
i
j and if Si = g
si , then Pi has
a valid share.
• PVSS algorithm:
– Pi choose a secret key z ∈ Zq and publishes y = h
z (mod p)
– the element V = gv of G and the pair (A,B) = (hα, v−1yα) (mod p)
are made public
– Pi can retrieve his share by calculating m = A
zB−1 (mod p)
– for some fixed l ≈ 100 and i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ l, dealer/prover
chooses wi ∈ Zq to compute thi = h
wi (mod p) and tgi = g
ywi .
– Using a cryptographically strong hash-function (for an in-depth dis-
cussion description of hash-functions see [2]), Hl : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}l,
she publishes
(c1, . . . , cl) = Hl(V ||A||B||th1||tg1||th2||tg2|| . . . ||thl||tgl)
He/she also publishes
(r1, . . . , rl) = (w1 − c1α (mod q), . . . , wl − clα (mod q))
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– verifier would compute thi = h
riAci (mod p) and tgi = (g
1−ciV ciB)y
ri
and then check whether Hl(V ||A||B||th1||tg1||th2||tg2|| . . . ||thl||tgl) is
(c1, . . . , cl).
1.2. eth root and Zn scheme. For this interactive PVSS scheme, the dealer
also uses El Gamal’s scheme and then must prove that the pair (A,B) encrypts the
e-th root of a public element M (see [9])
• secret to Pi: random z ∈ Zn
• secret to dealer: random α ∈ Zn
• public: g ∈ Z∗n, y = g
z (mod n), (A,B) = (gα,myα), M = me
• Pi can retrieve his share by calculating m = A
−zB (mod n)
• dealer picks w ∈ {0, . . . , ⌈2lnl+ǫ⌉} and makes tg = g
w (mod n) and ty =
yew public
• the verifier publishes c ∈ {0, . . . , 2l − 1}
• the dealer publishes r = w − cα
• the verifier checks that tG = g
rAc (mod n) and ty = y
er(Be/M)c (mod n)
2. New schemes
In recent years, non-abelian groups have been used in cryptography. One of
the first cryptosystems over a non-abelian group was suggested by Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld [1]. Conjugation in non-abelian groups is central to the cryptosystems
proposed by [6]. In particular [4] and [8] proposed new secret sharing protocols
using group presentations. Also [5] non-abelian El Gamal key exchange has been
used. For more information on group-based cryptography see [7] and [3] In this
paper we are proposing a new PVSS and VSS protocols using non-abelian groups.
2.1. Non-Commutative Key Exchange using Conjugacy. [5]
In this section, we discuss the use of conjugation in protocols over non-abelian
groups as background to the new protocols proposed. Suppose G is a non-abelian
group and S, T ⊂ G such that [S, T ] = 1. Bob takes s ∈ S, b ∈ G and publishes b
and c = bs as his public keys, keeping s as his private key. Here bs = s−1bs. If Alice
wishes to send x ∈ G as a session key to Bob, she first chooses a random t ∈ T and
sends
E = x(c
t)
to Bob, along with the header
h = bt.
Bob then calculates (bt)s = (bs)t = ct with the header. He can now compute
E′ = (ct)−1
which allows him to decrypt the session key,
(x(c
t))E
′
= (x(c
t))(c
t)
−1
= x.
The element x ∈ G can now be used as a session key.
The feasibility of this protocol rests on the assumption that products and in-
verses of elements of G can be computed efficiently. To deduce Bob’s private key
from public information would require solving the equation c = bs for s, given the
public values b and c. This is called the conjugacy search problem for G. Thus the
security of this scheme rests on the assumption that there is no fast algorithm for
solving the conjugacy search problem for the group G.
4 D. KAHROBAEI AND E.VIDAURRE
2.2. PVSS using non-abelian groups. Authentication schemes described
in [7] use conjugation, which of course require non-abelian groups. Although au-
thentication serves a different purpose, the method also works for PVSS.
An algorithm analogous to one of Stadler’s starts out with the non-abelian El
Gamal. Each participant randomly chooses his private key s ∈ S and publishes
b and c = bs. Here bs = s−1bs. The dealer then picks a random t ∈ T and
publishes (A,B) = (bt, xc
t
). Consequently, the participant will find that his secret
share is x = B(A
s)−1 . For verification, the dealer must prove that the pair (A,B)
encrypts the element with which a public element N and n are conjugate. The
dealer chooses a random y, w ∈ G and publishes N = nx, th = b
w and tg = b
yw .
The verifier publishes r ∈ {0, 1}. If r = 0, then the dealer sends c = wt. If r = 1,
then the dealer sends c = w. Then the verifier can check that th = A
c
2.3. VSS using non-abelian groups. Suppose there are n participants and
each is given a secret share so that at least t = n − 1 of them have to be together
to obtain the secret s. Let G be a nonabelian group where the search conjugacy
problem is hard and F be an abelian subset with n elements. The dealer secretly
sends fi to each participant Pi. Next, for every i ≤ n, the following are published
S = (
n∏
i=1
fi)
−1s
n∏
i=1
fi and hi = (
∏
i6=j
fj)
−1s
∏
i6=j
fj .
Any t participants can recover the secret by conjugating hi by the inverse of the
product of their shares, where i is the missing participant. In order for Pi to
verify that his/her share is valid, s/he can check that f−1i hifi = S. Lastly, if
Pi and Pj want to verify that each other’s shares are valid, then they can check
that f−1i hjfi = f
−1
j hifi without making their secret shares known to the other
participant.
Clearly, the platform group cannot be abelian as conjugation is heavily used.
If the group is given by a presentation, then the elements in the subset F can
be any elements that have their (pairwise) commutators in the presentation of
the group. If there are not enough of these elements, then powers of any one of
these elements can serve as another secret share; the only problem with this is
that the scheme becomes less secure in this case. Examples of non-abelian groups
that can be used are polycyclic and metabelian groups. Metabelian groups would
be particularly convenient as a platform group because it would be easy to find
commuting elements.
Alternatively, defining hi = (
∏
j∈Hi
fj)
−1s
∏
j∈Hi
fj where Hi is a subset of F
with t elements allows for any threshold t. Similarly, any t participants can recover
the secret by conjugating the appropriate hi by the inverse of the product of their
shares. However, the dealer has not published enough information for a participant
to verfify that his share is vaild.
The requirement that the search conjugacy problem be hard in the platform
group is necesarry for the security of the scheme. If the search conjugacy problem
were efficiently solvable in the group, then an adversary could determine fi from S
and hi and therefore recover the secret.
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